# Tag Info

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### Are there more truths than proofs?

That's correct, but it is not very interesting: we don't have "access" to most mathematical facts. It is not even clear what a proof of an arbitrary mathematical fact would mean, because to ...
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### How do we know what natural numbers are?

How do the mathematicians that write standard natural numbers have formal consensus on what they are talking about? Mathematicians work in a meta-system (which is usually ZFC unless otherwise stated)....
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### Do we have to prove how parentheses work in the Peano axioms?

In formal language theory (most relevantly, context-free languages), there is the notion of an abstract syntax tree. A decent chunk of formal language theory is figuring out how to turns flat, linear ...

### With this definition of completeness, Gödel's Incompleteness result seems not surprising, so why it was back then?

Did people really thought that for every theory and a given formula, either it or its negation are semantically valid, i.e. fulfilled by every model? (Emphasis added). No, of course not. It's easy to ...
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### What exactly is a contradiction and how does it differ from falsity?

Your understanding is correct. Put simply, a contradiction is a sentence that is always false. More precisely, A statement is a contradiction iff it is false in all interpretations. In propositional ...

### How to think about theories that prove their own inconsistency?

When we think about theories like ZFC or PA, we often view them foundationally: in particular, we often suppose that they are true. Truth is very strong. Although it's difficult to say exactly what it ...
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### What's the point of allowing only quantification of variables in first-order logic.

It's because when we do allow broader scopes of quantification, things get extremely ugly. One extremely important fact about first-order logic is that it has a reasonable notion of proof: if I want ...
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### Convert "Only Believers respect God" to predicate logic.

OP's proposed solution is that there exists at least one believer, who also respects God. This is not equal to the original request, and indeed need not even be true. For example, if nobody ...
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### What will be the negation of this statement:

Yes, that works. In logic, the original is: $\forall x (S(x) \rightarrow \exists y (H(y) \land I(y,x) \land \exists z (P(z) \land L(z,y) \land ((R(x) \land B(x)) \lor (E(x) \land K(x)))))$ If you ...
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### With this definition of completeness, Gödel's Incompleteness result seems not surprising, so why it was back then?

EDIT: I've added here some of the facts from the discussion between me and the OP in the comments below the question. These doesn't address the actual OP - "why was Godel's theorem surprising?" - but ...

### With this definition of completeness, Gödel's Incompleteness result seems not surprising, so why it was back then?

It may be useful to point out that there are (at least) two purposes for which axiomatic theories are created and, as a result, two sorts of theories, for which we may have very different expectations....
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### Are the natural numbers implicit in the construction of first-order logic? If so, why is this acceptable?

I think there are two (very interesting) questions here. Let me try to address them. First, the title question: do we presuppose natural numbers in first-order logic? I would say the answer is ...
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### Are quantifiers redundant by treating free variables as implicitly universally quantified?

The problem with replacing $\exists$ with $\neg\forall\neg$ to not have to worry about the order of quantifiers becomes apparent if you actually try doing so and omitting the quantifiers. For ...

### Distributive Property of Quantifiers

here are some basic distributive properties in quantifiers, hope it might help someone. ∀x(P(x) ∧ Q(x)) ≡ (∀xP(x) ∧ ∀xQ(x)) ∃x(P(x) ∧ Q(x)) → (∃xP(x) ∧ ∃xQ(x)) ∀x(P(x) ∨ Q(x)) ← (∀xP(x) ∨ ∀xQ(...

### Are these arguments invalid?

A nice tool for analyzing these kinds of categorical syllogisms are Venn Diagrams. Let's do this for the first argument. First, draw a Venn diagram for the 3 sets of things involved in the argument: ...
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### Second-order logic as the basis for set theory

The thing about the second-order of $\sf ZFC$ is that $M$ is a model of second-order $\sf ZFC$ if and only if $M$ is isomorphic to $V_\kappa$ for an inaccessible $\kappa$. So right off the bat you ...
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### Why do first order languages have at most countably many symbols?

You can have as many symbols as you like in your language! For instance, with a possibly uncountable language $L$, the Lowenheim-Skolem theorem becomes: If $\mathcal{M}$ is an $L$-structure, then ...

### Set theoretic concepts in first order logic

The questions assumes that there is some notion of "set" in first-order logic itself, but there is not. We use sets to study first-order logic, particularly the semantics (models) aspect. But these ...

### Why not ban nested quantifiers over the same variable?

It could be done, as described in the other answers. But it would not make capture-avoiding substitution easier to define, so there's no real benefit. On the other hand, we would lose the sometimes ...
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### How do we compare the set of natural numbers in different models of ZFC

We cannot compare the $\omega$s in different models, can we? If we say that one is embeddable into another, an embedding $\omega\rightarrow\omega'$ between the two sets of natural numbers in different ...
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### Nonstandard infinite / hyperfinite sum in IST

Welcome to Math.SE! You did not indicate how much background you have in Internal Set Theory (IST) - but based on what you wrote, it seem like you have a few misconceptions about it. Let us start by ...

### Understanding ZFC

ZFC does generate a “theory”. Formally speaking, a theory is simply a set of sentences in the given formal language. Any set of axioms generates a theory, namely the collection of sentences provable ...
The problem is that it's possible $f$ has no integer roots, but there is no proof of this fact (in whatever theory of arithmetic you are using). You're right that if $f$ does have a root, then you ...
Does it mean that if $\varphi$ is true in intuitionistic logic, $\varphi^N$ is not necessarily intuitionistically true? First, let's get the meaning of "a sentence $\varphi$ may not imply its ...