Problem:
Let $J$ be an integer and let $I$ be an integer multiple of $J$. Let ${\cal I}= \lbrace 1,2,\ldots, I\rbrace$ and ${\cal J}= \lbrace 1,2,\ldots, J\rbrace$. The set $X_{I,J}$ of all $\frac{I}{J}$-subsets of $\cal I$ contains exactly $N=\binom{I}{\frac{I}{J}}$ elements. Now, consider the set $Y_{I,J}$ of all permutations of $X_{I,J}$, viewed as columns enumerating the elements of $X_{I,J}$. There are $N!$ permutations in $Y_{I,J}$. Next, let $V$ be a $N\times J$ matrix whose entries are sets in $X_{I,J}$, and all of whose columns are in $Y_{I,J}$. Let $\cal V$ denote the set of all such matrices. The cardinality of $\cal V$ is $N!^{J}$.
The goal is to prove that for any $V \in \mathcal{V}$, and for any $m \in \mathbb{R}_+^J$ such that $m$ is injective ($m_a \ne m_b$ if $a \ne b$) , there exists an $s=(s_1,\ldots,s_J)$ and a $p=(p_1,\ldots,p_I)$ such that \begin{align} \forall a \ne b \in \mathcal{J}, & \:\:V_{s_a,a} \cap V_{s_b,b} = \varnothing \\ \forall j \in \mathcal{J}, \forall k \in \{1,\ldots,s_j-1\}, &\sum_{i \in V_{k,j}} p_i > m_j \\ \forall j \in \mathcal{J}, &\sum_{i \in V_{s_j,j}} p_i \leq m_j \end{align}
Motivation: If I can prove the above, I can argue existence of equilibria in a pretty unique context with indivisible objects, fiat money and quotas.
This is something I believe to be true. I even have a rough Matlab algorithm based on Walrasian Tatonnement that finds $s$ and $m$ given $V$, and I've found $s$ and $m$ for hundreds of thousands of randomly-generated $V$ without failing to find one, but it often requires a lot of manual tinkering (messing with increments and such) and the algorithm doesn't have nice properties that lend it to an existence proof.
Anwyay, I'm stumped as to how to prove it. Even if you cannot prove it, any suggestions as to what I might try would be greatly appreciated.
Example and Interpretation: Let $I=6$ and $J=3$. For expositional purposes, let's put $\mathcal{I}$ in letters, i.e. $\mathcal{I}=\{A,B,C,D,E,F\}$. Then $V_{example} =$
\begin{array}{ccc} \{B,C\} & \{A,B\} & \{C,D\} \\ \mathbf{\{B,D\}} & \{B,C\} & \{B,C\} \\ \{A,C\} & \{B,D\} & \{A,C\} \\ \{C,D\} & \{B,E\} & \{C,E\} \\ \{A,B\} & \{B,F\} & \{C,F\} \\ \{C,E\} & \{C,D\} & \{A,B\} \\ \{C,F\} & \mathbf{\{C,E\}} & \{A,D\} \\ \{B,E\} & \{C,F\} & \{E,F\} \\ \{B,F\} & \{A,C\} & \mathbf{\{A,F\}} \\ \{D,E\} & \{A,D\} & \{B,D\} \\ \{D,F\} & \{A,E\} & \{B,E\} \\ \{E,F\} & \{A,F\} & \{B,F\} \\ \{A,D\} & \{D,E\} & \{D,E\} \\ \{A,E\} & \{D,F\} & \{D,F\} \\ \{A,F\} & \{E,F\} & \{A,E\} \\ \end{array} If $m=(3,2.9,2.8)$. Then $s=(2,7,9)$ -- the cells are bolded above -- and $p=(p_A,\ldots,p_F) = (1.375,1.55,1.5,1.45,1.4,1.425)$ meet the above conditions.
You can interpret the conditions as follows. Condition 1 states that no letter may be used in more than one column of $V$. Condition 2 states that all the cells above the bolded ones contain elements whose prices in terms of $p$ sum to greater than $m_j$. Condition 3 states that each bolded cell is such that prices in terms of $p$ sum to less than or equal to $m_j$.
Note that serial dictatorships will often work. By that, I mean that $s_1=1$ and that each subsequent agent $j$ gets the best available bundle that doesn't conflict with any of the players before. I even have conditions under which such allocations will always be an equilibrium, but in some cases it won't. I intentionally put this example in because it is one case in which there exists an $m$ such that there exists no equilibrium where $s_1=1$.