Discover parameters of a Reed-Solomon code from its output chirp.io is a site/app for sharing e.g a photo identified by a short FSK audio chirp. The chirp is 10 symbols of data, then 8 symbols of error correction. These symbols are 32-valued (5 bits/symbol) and the error correcting code is a Reed-Solomon code.  Thus, a chirp is the output of an $
RS[n,k,t]$ $= RS[18, 10, 4]$ encoder
over the field $GF(32)$ or $\mathbb F_{2^5}$. These details are from a partial description of the chirp.io protocol
An example chirp is gfhd9532dm (base 32) for which the error 
parity symbols are 4fbeu0mo. Given this information is it possible to determine the other parameters (e.g. the generator polynomial of the Galois/finite field) of the coder, in order to check/correct a received chirp?
So far I've systematically tried candidate parameters (i.e brute force search) with trials.py but without success.
ETA: api.chirp.io returns a chirp (and parity symbols) in response to a JSON POST. e.g.
$ curl -X 'POST' -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
       -d '{"body":"abc","mimetype":"text/plain","title":"abc"}' \
       'https://api.chirp.io/0/chirp'
{"longcode": "ovkp99793iao89q5ku", "shortcode": "ovkp99793i", "is_new": 1}

I'm guessing that making more than a few such requests would trigger blocking or rate limiting, and doing so without express permission isn't something I'm willing to do.
ETA 2017-02-05: The original Chirp app has been discontinued, the above request now returns HTTP 404.
 A: From just the information given (that one codeword of a systematic
$RS[18,10,4]$ code
is gfhd9532dm4fbeu0mo), it is not possible to identify what the code is or
how the finite field was set up as binary $5$-tuples etc.  The problem
is better viewed as attempting to determine a hashing function that maps
gfhd9532dm onto 4fbeu0mo from just the results of this single hash.
Many hashing functions will give this result, and even if one is found
(and even if it seems to fit what a Reed-Solomon encoder would be expected
to do), there is no reason to believe that the function is the correct one
and will work on the next 10 data symbols too.  From a cryptographic
perspective, you have a known plaintext attack with a single plaintext 
available. Multiple known plaintexts would be better, and a chosen plaintext
attack where you are allowed to specify the data symbols (especially
with multiple chosen plaintexts) would be even better.
A: Actually, there is one paper that's exactly looking into this issue:

Zahedi, A., & Mohammad-Khani, G. R. (2012). "Reconstruction of a non-binary block code from an intercepted sequence with application to reed-solomon codes". IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences, 95(11), 1873-1880.
Abstract: In this paper, a method is proposed for reconstruction of
the parameters of a non-binary block encoder using an intercepted
sequence of noisy coded data. The proposed method is a generalization
of the Barbier's method for the reconstruction of binary block codes
to the more problematic case of non-binary codes. It has been shown
mathematically that considering some revisions in definitions, such a
generalization is possible. The proposed method is able to estimate
the code parameters such as the code length, the code dimension,
number of bits per symbol, and the dual-code subspace, and also to
synchronize the sequence. Since the Reed-Solomon code is the most
important type of non-binary block codes, an additional method is
proposed to reconstruct the generator polynomial in the case of
Reed-Solomon codes. The proposed method is evaluated via computer
simulations which verify its strength and effectiveness.

However, I don't know how their algorithms work since I could not get an access to the paper, but you can buy it online if you really need it.
