Mathematical Notation and its importance You can see how mathematical notation evolved during the last centuries here.
I think everyone here knows that a bad notation can change an otherwise elementar problem into a difficult problem. Just try to do basic arithmetics with roman numbers, for example.
As a computer programmer I know that in some situations programming language notation plays a critical rule because some algorithms are better expressed in a particular language than in other languages even considering they all have the same basis: Lambda Calculus, Turing machines, etc
The linguists has their so-called Sapir–Whorf hypothesis which "...holds that the structure of a language affects the ways in which its respective speakers conceptualize their world, i.e. their world view, or otherwise influences their cognitive processes."
Then, I ask: is there any field in Math that studies Math's notation and its influence for good or for bad in Math itself?
Modifying the fragment on the paragraph above:
is it possible that the notation, the symbols and the language used in Math affects the ways in which Mathematicians conceptualize their world and influences their cognitive processes?
 A: On a quite different tack, you might well be interested in Mohan Ganesalingham's The Language of Mathematics: A Linguistic and Philosophical Investigation (Springer 2013). 
The author is an outstanding mathematician (Senior Wrangler, no less), and has a degree in linguistics, and now works in computer science. The book is based on a prize-winning thesis. I mention those facts in case the word "philosophical" in the sub-title puts you off! Mohan seriously knows his stuff.
A: In my opinion, this is one of the exciting promises of intuitionistic mathematics and topos theory.
By discarding the law of the excluded middle $\neg\neg P\implies  P$ (of course, we can add it back later if we want), much more of the structure of our axioms becomes evident in our theorems, because we can no longer label arbitrary statements as true-or-false.
For example, in topos theory, one no longer speaks of "the" real numbers, but of "a" real numbers object in a topos.  When the topos is $Set$, nothing special happens.  But in a different setting, we may have a countable real numbers object, or nontrivial subobjects without points.  My understanding is that there are also topoi for which every function $\mathbb{R}\to\mathbb{R}$ is differentiable (which should be a relief to any physicists who pretend this all the time).
I like this view because it makes certain properties of "the" real numbers—its cardinality, for example—appear to be artifacts of the language of sets, which relies upon a firm notion of membership.  But since the vast majority of real numbers cannot be pinned down in any meaningful sense, it is not hard to argue that treating $\mathbb{R}$ as a set is, at the very least, a choice of perspective.
And this can actually be useful—the now-classic quantum physics paper What is a Thing? has argued that the standard $\mathbb{R}$ is inadequate for non-classical theories of physics.  After all, if the number of particles in a system is dependent on how we measure the system, then why should we expect anything in the universe to behave like a set?
A: Here is an interesting recent point of view:
Foundations of Science 
March 2014, Volume 19, Issue 1, pp 1-10 
Script and Symbolic Writing in Mathematics and Natural Philosophy
Maarten Van Dyck, 
 Albrecht Heeffer 
Abstract
We introduce the question whether there are specific kinds of writing modalities and practices that facilitated the development of modern science and mathematics. We point out the importance and uniqueness of symbolic writing, which allowed early modern thinkers to formulate a new kind of questions about mathematical structure, rather than to merely exploit this structure for solving particular problems. In a very similar vein, the novel focus on abstract structural relations allowed for creative conceptual extensions in natural philosophy during the scientific revolution. These preliminary reflections are meant to set the stage for the following contributions in this volume.
See http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10699-012-9310-y
Another recent article that has a bit too much psychology in it for my taste but may be of interest to you is the following:
January 2013, Volume 190, Issue 1, pp 3-19 
Mathematical symbols as epistemic actions
Helen De Cruz, 
 Johan De Smedt 
Abstract
Recent experimental evidence from developmental psychology and cognitive neuroscience indicates that humans are equipped with unlearned elementary mathematical skills. However, formal mathematics has properties that cannot be reduced to these elementary cognitive capacities. The question then arises how human beings cognitively deal with more advanced mathematical ideas. This paper draws on the extended mind thesis to suggest that mathematical symbols enable us to delegate some mathematical operations to the external environment. In this view, mathematical symbols are not only used to express mathematical concepts—they are constitutive of the mathematical concepts themselves. Mathematical symbols are epistemic actions, because they enable us to represent concepts that are literally unthinkable with our bare brains. Using case-studies from the history of mathematics and from educational psychology, we argue for an intimate relationship between mathematical symbols and mathematical cognition.
See http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11229-010-9837-9
