Have I misunderstood this argument about truth values? 7.2.1 Every truth value is confirmed by intuition that affirms it.
$(x)(Tx\to Ix)$
7.2.2. Every intuition that affirms truth value is a feeling of correctness.
$(x)(Ix\to Cx)$
7.2.3. The feeling of correctness cannot be proven to be a criterion for determining truth values.
$(x)(Cx\to \sim D)$
Ergo, there exists no tool for determining truth values.
$(x)\sim D$
I know that the above is incorrect, because there's no way that that conclusion can be inferred from those premises. What is the mistake?
 A: Among other things, the argument assumes that determining a truth value, affirming a truth value, and a truth value being confirmed are all materially equivalent. Further the symbolic version of the argument could be more precise; for example,
$\forall x \exists y (Tx \implies (Cx \implies (Iy \land Ayx)))$
could be used instead of the first formula, where ‘C’ means “is confirmed” and ‘A’ means “affirms”.
A: *

*$Px$: $x$ is a proposition

*$Tx$: $x$ is a tool

*$Vp$: proposition $p$ is true

*$Ip$: intuition says that proposition $p$ is true

*$Fp$: feeling says that proposition $p$ is true

*$Ltp$: tool $t$ says that proposition $p$ is true

Another translation of the given premises and conclusions:

*

*

7.2.1 Every truth value is confirmed by intuition that affirms it.
$(x)(Tx\to Ix)$

$\forall p\;\Big(Pp\to(Vp\leftrightarrow Ip)\Big)$


*

7.2.2. Every intuition that affirms truth value is a feeling of correctness.
$(x)(Ix\to Cx)$

$\forall p\;\Big(Pp\to(Ip\leftrightarrow Fp)\Big)$


*

7.2.3. The feeling of correctness cannot be proven to be a criterion for
determining truth values.
$(x)(Cx\to \sim D)$

$\sim\forall p\;\Big(Pp\to(Fp\leftrightarrow Vp)\Big)$


*

Ergo, there exists no tool for determining truth values.
$(x)\sim D$

Therefore, $\sim\exists t\;\bigg(Tt\land\;\forall p\;\Big(Pp\to(Ltp\leftrightarrow Cp)\Big)\bigg).$
This argument is valid, due to its premises being inconsistent.
