One can convert a sequential game into a simultaneous move normal form game by defining contingent plans of what to do for any possible sequence of observable moves and allowing players to choose over these strategies simultaneously.
It is known that the Nash equilibria (NE) of the resulting normal form game can describe some unreasonable situations (e.g., non-credible threats).
One way of avoiding this is to look at extensive-form refinements of NE and invoke backward induction (starting from the end of the game and computing strategies backward in time) leading to subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE).
Question: Intuitively, it seems SPNE are a more constrained version of NE. Is it possible to formulate the problem as a normal form game but impose some additional constraints on the form of the strategies such that the resulting computed equilibria is a SPNE and not just a NE? Perhaps some of the rows/columns are ruled out of the game matrix, or the problem of computing SPNE becomes a constrained LP?