Does decidability imply inconsistency? I have always thought that according to Gödel's incompleteness problems, every inconsistent theory would be decidable.
This is indicated, here for example: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Decidability_(logic)

There are several basic results about decidability of theories. Every inconsistent theory is decidable, as every formula in the signature of the theory will be a logical consequence of, and thus a member of, the theory.

But I was having a conversation with a mathematician and he told me quite the contrary.
We were having a discussion and I mentioned that inconsistent theories would be decidable. He said:

Undecidability requires first-order logic, and that's it.  No Paraconsistent logic, Trivialism, or even Deviant logic.  Just plain old first-order logic.
  I think you are sort of kind of in the right neighborhood, but there are a few technical issues we need as a prerequisite to continue talking.  For instance, you say that "decidability implies inconsistency".  Actually, decidability implies the exact opposite, it implies consistency

I thought that a truly inconsistent theory would be completely decidable, as everything would be provable. But now I am doubting...
But is this right? Am I completely wrong? Can't there be inconsistent and decidable theories? And can there be inconsistent and undecidable theories?
 A: It looks like your mathematician got carried away a bit at the end, because of course decidability does not imply consistency. As you point out, an inconsistent theory is decidable because it proves everything. (If you want to refer to Gödel for that, it's the completeness theorem you want, though). And inconsistent theories certainly exist.
On the other hand, we can have a consistent theory that is decidable such as in first-order logic with equality but no other non-logical symbol the theory with the single axiom $$ \forall x\forall y(x=y) $$
It is consistent because it has a model (with a single object); it is decidable because this is the only model and it is easy to evaluate any wff to a truth value in that model.
We can also have a consistent theory that is undecidable -- at least we hope PA and ZFC are such theories.
So the only nontrivial implication among these properties and their negation is yours: inconsistency implies decidability (or contraposed: undecidability implies consistency).
A: You're right that every inconsistent theory is decidable. In fact, here is the decision procedure for any inconsistent theory:
Input: [any statement]
Output: "Yes, that's a theorem!"
So, inconsistency implies decidablity
But this is the converse of what your teacher claims you are saying:

For instance, you say that "decidability implies inconsistency".

??Huh? You are not saying that at all
and when your teacher says:

Actually, decidability implies the exact opposite, it implies consistency

Well, that's just plain wrong, for that would mean that inconsistency implies undecidability and, as we just saw, inconsistency instead implies decidability 
