Is this "A unified theory of logic"? (Apologies for the (near) click-baity pun title.) I want to point out that I do have doubts about posting this since it's a very soft question that could just as well fit in at philosophy.stackexchange, but mainly since it's a request for your opinions. However, I am mainly a mathematician, and I want to hear mainly from mathematicians; And I will take this down immediately, if this type of question is prohibited or frowned upon. Also, in no way am I directing any critique or disrespect towards the author and his work.
Setup
I stumbled across this book recently: Unified Logic: How to Divide by Zero, Solve the Liar's Paradox, And Understand The Nature of Truth, by Jesse Bollinger ((allegedly) an amateur mathematician); Published only a couple of months ago. Obviously a very bold title, almost to the point of being silly. I have only read the contents and parts of the text via previews (about 70 pages avaible), but it seems ambitious; It's about 800 pages, in which it claims to define a new unified type of logic that makes sense of dividing by zero (for an interesting and rigorous attempt at this see Wheel theory, by J.Carlström), and resolving the Liar Paradox, amongst other things. One reason for this question is that I can't seem to find much said about this anywhere, by anyone. I did find this, which seems a bit weird considering what the host of that article does. Now, to my question.
Question(s)
Has anyone here read the book in question (whole text or parts thereof), or know anything of Jesse Bollinger and/or his research? If so, would you mind sharing your thoughts about what you have read. Or would someone with a bit more background in logic perhaps feel inclined to give their first impressions based on what you can read in available previews?
My own skepticism
My suspicion is that this has not reached (affected) the mathematical community for understandable reasons. I admit that I do not take this work too seriously at a glance, but then again: I am no logician, and I have not read the whole thing. I can merely state some of my reasons for being skeptic, such as the very informal writing style and language, combined with the extremely bold claims and mostly the fact that I can't seem to find anything published in a mathematical journal about this, or much else about it at all. He also seems to simplify things quite alot more than you would perhaps expect; especially clear in the first sections on truth. There have been bookloads written in philosophy about theories of truth (I personally recommend Kirkham's Theories of Truth). What I did read didn't seem completely dismissible either, but I would rather take a logicians word on it.
It seems perhaps (at a glance) not very likely to be of great significance to logic research, but works of great significance has come from unexpected places before; Also, perhaps I am not used to seeing books of this seemingly profound nature and serious work, being published if they are pure nonsense.
You may find a preview via this page
 A: Here's an excerpt:

Definition 4. The set of all objects to which a statement refers once properly interpreted will henceforth be referred to as the semantic set of the statement. The semantic set captures as many objects as necessary to capture the full meaning of the statement, including not just physical objects but also any conceptual objects and relationships that are relevant. The semantic set of a statement and the meaning of a statement are synonymous. The semantic set fully expresses a statement's entire meaning. Just like the symbolic set, it is simply an inert object. Once constructed it is no longer open to reinterpretation or parsing.

(The author does not define what a statement is.) So, no: This is not math.
For comparison, here's a similarly early definition from a random introductory book on mathematical logic on my shelf:

Definition 4.1. A deduction of a formula $P$ from a set of formulas ${\mathcal E}$ (in a language $L$ in $\mathfrak{L}_1$) is a finite sequence of formulas $P_1, \dots, P_n = P$ with the property that for each $i = 1, \dots, n$, at least one of the following alternatives holds: 
(a) $P_i\in {\mathcal E}$; 
(b) $\exists j < i$ such that $P_i$ is a direct consequence of $P_j$ using Gen; 
(c) $\exists j, k < i$ such that $P_i$ is a direct consequence of $P_j$ and $P_k$ using MP.

