# Semantics for minimal logic

Minimal logic is a fragment of intuitionistic logic that rejects not only the classical law of excluded middle (as intuitionistic logic does), but also the principle of explosion (ex falso quodlibet). Essentially, from proof-theoretical viewpoint, this means that in minimal logic the bottom $\bot$ is considered as a propositional variable, without any special inference rule involving it.

Question: Is there a semantics $\mathcal{S}$ for minimal logic such that a completeness theorem holds? By completeness theorem I mean a statement of the form (for both propositional and first-order languages):

For every formula $A$, $A$ is provable in minimal logic if and only if $A$ is valid in all $\mathcal{S}$-structures.

I guess such a semantics could be a generalization of intuitionistic Kripke models.

I would like also to have some references about completeness theorem in (propositional and/or first-order) minimal logic.

• I find it boggling that one would throw in a gratuitous propositional constant without any axioms relating to it. I find it especially boggling that one would name the constant $\bot$ when it is not a bottom element.
– user14972
Jan 28, 2018 at 22:52
• Can I ask the reason of the recent downvote? Apr 5, 2018 at 19:04