Tarski's axioms for Euclidean geometry can also be used to axiomatize absolute geometry (by leaving out his version of the Axiom of Euclid) and hyperbolic/Lobachevskian geometry (by negating that same axiom) (see the last paragraph of "Discussion" here).
Question: Can similar subsets of Tarski's axioms be used to define axiomatizations for both:
Notes: (The tag first-order-logic is because Tarski's axioms are all written in terms of first-order logic, and to understand them well, e.g. unlike me, one would have to understand first-order logic at least somewhat well. Plus as a result the resulting axiom systems for ordered and affine geometry I am requesting would also be in terms of first-order logic. If this is an inappropriate reason for the tag, please feel free to remove the tag - I don't use it frequently so don't know its correct usage.)
The notion of betweenness which underlies ordered geometry also seems essential to Tarski's axiomatization approach. So to me it would be really surprising to me if Tarski's axioms could not be used to state an axiom system of ordered geometry.
The answer for affine geometry may be negative according to this stray quote I found:
Szmielew wished to keep the simplicity (in terms of obtaining metamathematical results) of Tarski’s system, but to gain the flexibility to be able to consider different kinds of geometry, such as affine geometry, which was not possible in Tarski’s formalization...
However, a reference for the claim nor details of a proof were forthcoming. I imagine the details might be found in the reviewed book, but I don't have access to said book and have very little knowledge of formal logic, so a dumbed-down summary of any argument why or why not it's possible would be more useful to me right now than the high-level arguments likely found therein.
Also the claim seems to possibly contradict other claims made in a paper by Tarski and Givant cited and quoted in the Wikipedia article about Tarski's axioms:
The first was the selection of the betweenness and equidistance relations as the only two primitive notions. Both notions have a clear and simple geometrical meaning; the former represents the affine, the latter the metric, aspect of geometry...
The axiom... is formulated entirely in terms of betweenness, and hence is useful in the construction of an axiom set for affine geometry.
However, the quotes might essentially just be observing that ordered geometry generalizes affine geometry (hence why betweenness as a notion can be essential for both types of geometry) and therefore not actually contradict the claim made in the review of Szmielew's book.
Still, the claim being true would be somewhat surprising to me, since Euclidean geometry is a special case of affine geometry, so why wouldn't it be possible to just drop some of Tarski's axioms (assuming that they are all independent of one another) and get affine geometry as the result?