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In Models of Peano Arithmetic by Kaye, p153, it states : Tennenbaum's theorem may be regarded as the model-theoretic analogue of the Godel-Rosser incompleteness theorem.

Similarly

In Cohen Set Theory and the Continuum Hypothesis, p49 it states "By a similar argument using Tarski's theorem on the un-definability of truth, (and without using recursively inseparable sets) one "easily" shows "There is no non-standard model M for the integers in which + and * are given by functions definable in Z1 (i.e. PA) and such that all the true statements of Z1 (PA) hold in M (a non standard model of Z1 (PA)).

My first question is - is there a proof of Cohens "easy" proof somewhere I could read?

My second question is on Kayes p153 statement : Is it saying that models of PA exist (viewed purely from the Metatheory) which satisfy additional statements to those that are derivable from Z1 (PA) and that these models include non-isomorphic models, called "Non-standard" models, and these additional statements are "not recursive" in that they aren't made up from a finite set of expressions based upon Z1 (PA) axioms. ? Are there examples of what these "additional statements" look like, or where they sit in the arithmetical higher-archy ? I suspect its saying more than this.

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I am afraid, I can not give you a satisfying answer on your first question, but I can try clear up the confusion expressed in your second question.

First of all, the theory of a model, i.e the collection of all sentences satisfied by the model, is always complete. We know, however, by the incompleteness theorem, that $PA$ is not complete. Therefore, every model of $PA$ has to satisfy statements that are not derivable from $PA$. For example, the standard model $\mathbb{N}$ satisfies $Con(PA)$ (well, presumably it does) and there is also a non-standard model of $PA$ satisfying $\neg Con(PA)$. (This is a consequence of the second incompleteness theorem. The claim that $Con(PA)$ is independent of $PA$ is equivalent to the assertion that there are models of $PA$ satisfying $Con(PA)$ and $\neg Con(PA)$.)

Secondly, Tennenbaum's theorem is not talking about the 'recursivity' of statements, but it talks about recursive (or to be more precise non recursive) models. This is, a priori, a different question. There is, however a deep connection between the two statements, as described, for example, in Kayes book (p.189) or in his article 'Tennenbaum’s Theorem for Models of Arithmetic' (2006).

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  • $\begingroup$ Thanks Jan. So maybe I have misunderstood Tennenbaum entirely ! Looking over Kaye definition of a recursive model, its one that is isomorphic, via any isomorphism function, to a model with domain N and recursive functions of +,* (not necessarily the real +,*). So its talking about whats possible in the Metatheory, in terms of the Metatheory recursive, and so finitely defined, functions ? $\endgroup$ – Little Cheese Sep 28 '16 at 11:41
  • $\begingroup$ Jan, also I note Kaye says (p154) that every non-standard M : M |=PA codes some non-recursive set. The justification for this is reference to Theorem 3.9 (simplified Godel Rosser) p38, that a recursive set of godel Numbers T is incomplete. The implication therefore is incomplete implies non-recursive. Presumably this is because PA can derive all recursive functions, so anything it can't derive (ie the missing incomplete statements) must be non-recursive ? $\endgroup$ – Little Cheese Sep 28 '16 at 12:00
  • $\begingroup$ Jan, So I've been wondering given the above two comments what the purpose of Tennenbaum is. As non-standard structures can be shown to exist by compactness (add a new element "c" and say its different from all elements "n" of N) - which is via an infinite number of expressions. So maybe Tennenbaum is saying there aren't any ways of creating a non-standard structure "roughly" in a finite number of steps (i.e. via some finite algorithm) ? $\endgroup$ – Little Cheese Sep 28 '16 at 12:06
  • $\begingroup$ Every countable set can be thought of as having domain $\omega$, the standard natural numbers (just with a different labeling, ie $a_0, a_1, a_2, \ldots$). So if we have a countable model of any theory, we can ask whether that model's functions/relations are computable functions and relations. Tenenbaum's theorem says that if M is a countable non-standard model of PA, then there is no algorithm which can compute addition or multiplication for that model. $\endgroup$ – Athar Abdul-Quader Sep 28 '16 at 12:50
  • $\begingroup$ Just noticed in Kaye - p189 the link between Godel-Rosser and Tennenbaum is formalised. It looks like using information related to Scott sets/Konigs Lemma + Tennenbaum implies Godel Rosser incompleteness (though I cant say I understand it yet). $\endgroup$ – Little Cheese Sep 28 '16 at 13:28

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