If a theory is 1-consistent then it is consistent

I am attempting to back two claims in this problem:

I use $\textbf{Q}$ to denote minimal arithmetic for this post.

I use the term 'rudimentary sentence' to denote formulas built using only negation, conjunction, disjunction, and bounded quantifications. It has been pointed out to me that these are more formally called $\Delta_0$ sentences. Additionally, '$\exists$-rudimentary' refers to $\Sigma_1$ sentences.

A theory $T$ is 1-consistent if for all $\exists$-rudimentary sentences of the form $\exists x$ $F(x)$ , if $T\vdash \neg F(0)$, $T\vdash \neg F(1)$, $T\vdash \neg F(2)$,... then $T\not\vdash\exists x$ $F(x)$.

To show: If $T$ is 1-consistent, then $T$ is consistent.

~~~~~~~~~~~~

From this point on, I assume that $T$ is a 1-consistent theory.

I use a function now $Prv_T(x)$ to mean $\vdash_T A$ if and only if the sentence $Prv(\ulcorner A\urcorner )$ is correct under the standard interpretation.

Let $T$ now be a 1-consistent ($\Sigma_1$-sound) theory extending minimal arithmetic.

I let $G$ be such that

$T \vdash G \leftrightarrow Prv(\ulcorner G\urcorner)$.

To show: $T\not\vdash \neg G$.

I apologize in advance if this is unclear, I am not yet totally comfortable communicating this material.

• Is "rudimentary sentence" your own word? It sounds like you're defining what is usually called $\Delta_0$ sentences, and your "$\exists$-rudimentary sentences" must be $\Sigma_1$ sentences. May 13 '16 at 7:17
• @HenningMakholm It is probably an informalism, I am following Boolos, Burgess, and Jeffrey, Computability and Logic. I apologize for this, I'll add it in.
– faux
May 13 '16 at 7:21
• By the way, the natural continuation of your $G$-based reasoning is Löb's theorem which says (under suitable assumptions) that if $T\vdash G\leftrightarrow Prv(\ulcorner G\urcorner)$ then $T\vdash G$. But in order to get the last step from $T\vdash G$ to $T\not\vdash \neg G$, you need to already know that $T$ is consistent, so I don't think you'll actually make progress that way. May 13 '16 at 7:33
• @HenningMakholm I apologize! You are very correct on that - for the second part, I am to operate under the assumption that $T$ is a 1-consistent ($\Sigma_1$-sound) theory extending minimal arithmetic (I will add that in now). Would Löb's theorem now apply?
– faux
May 13 '16 at 7:39
• x @faux: I think Löb's theorem applies (if you have enough machinery available to construct your $G$ in the first place, which I'll assume) -- I'm just doubting that it's helpful for your goal of proving $T$ consistent. May 13 '16 at 7:43

Instead simply consider that in an inconsistent theory everything is provable. So if $T$ is inconsistent, you can let $F$ be any formula whatsoever; the premise of your definition of "1-consistent" will then be satisfied but the conclusion is not. So it is impossible for a theory to be inconsistent yet 1-consistent.