In Game Theory, we generally refer to "normal form" and "extensive form" as representations. And, we generally describe "Nash Equilibrium," "strictly dominated strategies," "maxmin strategies," "correlated equilibrium," "correlated rationalizability" and "self-conforming equilibrium" as solution concepts. Yet, some scholars refer to "Bayesian Games" or "Repeated Games" as representations while others refer to them as game types. What then are the analytical definitions for a "solution concept," "representation," and "game type?" And, are "Bayesian Games" and "Repeated Games" better defined as representations, game types, or something else altogether?
Thanks to Harsanyi, Bayesian games can be represented as an extensive form game with Nature (or chance) moving at the initial node. So I'd say they are more of a game type: games with incomplete information.
Repeated games are a special case of extensive form games. So they are also a game type, I'd say.