This question was closed due to lack of own effort shown. Because I like the game of werewolf (a.k.a. Mafia) and thought it was a nice idea to pose a simplified version of it as a game-theoretic problem, I'm posting the question (rephrased) and answering it (which I think should count as sufficient own effort shown :-).
There are two werewolves and two townsfolk. The werewolves know who everyone else is, but the townsfolk only know their own identity. A voting order is uniformly randomly determined and announced, and then each player votes against one of the other three players, in the determined order and for everyone to hear. The townsfolk win if at least one of the players with the most votes is a werewolf; otherwise the werewolves win.
The other question wasn't specific about coordination of strategies. I found the problem interesting when I assumed that the strategies can be fully coordinated, so that's what I'm going to assume here, but feel free to also comment on solutions for the case where either or both teams don't know their teammate's strategy.
So let's assume that there's a reliable town magazine, known not to be infiltrated by werewolves, and the very smart editors have worked out the very best strategy to adopt when faced with this predicament, and published it. So though the townspeople don't know their identities, they know that whoever is on their team is playing according to the published strategy. The werewolves, of course, don't need a magazine; they just sneak off at night to secretly strategize. But they can read, so they know the townspeoples' strategy. (I believe the result doesn't depend on whether the townspeople know the werewolves' strategy, but for definiteness, you can assume that they don't.)
What is the probability for the townspeople to win, assuming optimal play of both teams?