Question about the proof of consistency iff satisfiability of a theory In pretty much any Model Theory or Logic textbook you will find the following claim, where $T$ is a theory (a set of $\mathsf{L}$-sentences),

$T$ is consistent if and only if $T$ is satisfiable.

Sometimes it is proved and sometimes it is not, I have read the proof from a few books and I have tried to shorten it as much as possible to what follows,

Assume to the contrary that there exists a theory $T$ such that $T$ is consistent and $T$ is not satisfiable. Since $T$ is not satisfiable, there does not exist any models $\mathcal{M}$ of $T$. So, any $\mathsf{L}$-structure which attempts to model $T$ is a model of $\perp$. Then, $T \vDash \perp$ so by the Completeness Theorem, $T \vdash \perp$; yet this contradicts the assumption that $T$ us consistent. Therefore, $T$ is consistent if and only if $T$ is satisfiable.

My question is as to why we can make the jump from "there does not exist any models of $T$", to "every model of $T$ is a model of $\varphi \wedge \neg \varphi$."
I thought I understood this stuff, but I am reviewing Godel's Completeness Theorem, the Compactness Theorem, and a couple related corollaries and found myself confused on this point. I'm sure it is very simple, but I thought I'd ask. Thanks.
EDIT: In some of the comments it has been indicated that the proof is circular because it uses the completeness theorem but is attempting to prove that direction. I will literally quote exactly from David Marker's, "Model Theory: An Introduction"

Corollary: $T$ is consistent if and only if $T$ is satisfiable.

Proof:

Suppose that $T$ is not satisfiable. Because there are no models of $T$, every model of $T$ is a model of $(\phi \wedge \neg \phi )$. Thus, $T \vDash (\phi \wedge \neg \phi)$ and by the Completeness Theorem $T \vdash (\phi \wedge \neg \phi)$

What is the difference between Marker's proof than the one I gave?
 A: In order to grasp the fact that there are two equivalent versions of the same theorem, I think it can be useful to review the details of a typical proof of it. See Joseph Shoenfield, Mathematical Logic (1967), page 43 :

Completeness Theorem (First Form : Gödel). A formula $A$ of a theory $T$ is a 
  theorem of $T$ iff it is valid in $T$ [see page 22 : By a model of a theory $T$, we mean a structure for $L(T)$ in which all the non-logical axioms of $T$ are valid (true). A formula is valid in $T$ if it is valid in every model of $T$; equivalently, if it is a logical consequence of the nonlogical axioms of $T$.] 
This theorem has a second form, which concerns consistency. 
Completeness Theorem (Second Form). A theory $T$ is consistent iff it has a model. 
We first show that the second form of the completeness theorem implies the first. 
In view of the closure theorem and its corollary, it suffices to prove the first form for a closed formula $A$. 
By the corollary to the reduction theorem for consistency [see page 42], $A$ is a theorem of $T$ iff $T \cup \{ \lnot A \}$ is inconsistent. 
By the second form of the completeness theorem, this holds iff $T \cup \{ \lnot A \}$ has no model. Now since $A$ is closed, a model of $T \cup \{ \lnot A \}$ is simply a model of $T$ in which $A$ is not valid. Hence $A$ is a theorem of $T$ iff $A$ is valid in every model of $T$. 

