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seen Nov 29 at 6:02

Nov
6
accepted Psuedo-inverse of block low-rank, symmetric matrix?
Nov
6
comment Psuedo-inverse of block low-rank, symmetric matrix?
Great! And would this approach still hold if the diagonal blocks were rank-1 plus a diagonal matrix?
Nov
6
comment Psuedo-inverse of block low-rank, symmetric matrix?
Is it possible to compute the Householder reflections in linear time or are they more expensive? It seems like that's the only potentially-costly part of this approach and I'm not finding any references for the complexity of computing them.
Nov
6
asked Psuedo-inverse of block low-rank, symmetric matrix?
Jul
2
awarded  Curious
May
5
comment Bayesian learning
Yep. I was confusing the problem with another problem that I was working on. This is just a straight-forward application of Bayes rule.
May
5
accepted Bayesian learning
May
3
revised Bayesian learning
deleted 2 characters in body
May
3
asked Bayesian learning
Mar
10
revised Understanding Blackwell's Approachability Theorem
deleted 3 characters in body
Mar
10
revised Understanding Blackwell's Approachability Theorem
added 4 characters in body
Mar
10
asked Understanding Blackwell's Approachability Theorem
Jan
19
comment Analytically solving (calculating Nash equilibrium for) 3-player extensive form games
It's fixed at 1 bet.
Jan
13
comment Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium of Rock Paper Scissors with 3 players?
I suppose it was the most intuitive payoff matrix to me. It's similar to poker, where you have a single pot and draws result in split pots.
Jan
13
awarded  Editor
Jan
13
awarded  Promoter
Jan
13
comment Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium of Rock Paper Scissors with 3 players?
I've added the payoff matrices that I'm thinking about.
Jan
13
revised Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium of Rock Paper Scissors with 3 players?
added payoff matrices
Jan
13
asked Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium of Rock Paper Scissors with 3 players?
Jan
11
asked Analytically solving (calculating Nash equilibrium for) 3-player extensive form games