Tagged Questions
3
votes
1answer
36 views
Stability under supremum of sets of social choice function with single peaked preferences
Here is a question emerging from reading Moulin, H. (1980). On strategy-proofness and single peakedness. Public Choice, 35(4), 437–455.
The setting is as follows:
A non-empty finite set of ...
4
votes
2answers
67 views
Does Arrow's Theorem apply when choosing a single best candidate?
According to Wiki, Arrow's Impossibility Theorem proves that we cannot create a social welfare function that obeys unanimity, non-dictatorship, and IIA.
However, in real elections, we want to choose ...
2
votes
0answers
58 views
What is the general formula for electoral districts tying.
I apologize if this question is a bit of a read. (You might want to get a frosty beverage.) Professor Alan Natapoff of MIT demonstrated, if 9 Voters are districted into 3 electoral districts of 3 ...
4
votes
1answer
78 views
Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem versus Arrow Theorem
Arrow Theorem is a very classical result in social choice theory, stating very roughly that any reasonable voting procedure is either dictatorial or subject to tactical voting. More precisely, there ...
7
votes
2answers
139 views
Is there a voting method with a sane strategy?
Is there a voting method where the best strategy for strategic voters can be explained in a sane way?
According to Gibbard–Satterthwaite, there is no "strategy-free" (and reasonable) voting ...
6
votes
1answer
99 views
Does it make sense to run Meek STV with more choices than seats?
During the current batch of moderator elections at Gaming, it has been argued that since only 2 seats are up for grabs in this round of elections, it only makes sense to cast ballots by only ranking ...
