# Tagged Questions

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### Are the following two definitions of Borda winner equivalent?

The Borda count is a method used to determine the winner object where people rank objects. For instance, imagine each person ranking 3 objects. The highest ranked object gets 2 points, the second gets ...
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### Counting in Arrow's theorem

I seem to be really confused with the counting system in Arrow's theorem. Can I have a simple explanation how they determine the outcome? I can't determine the outcome using rules from my notes. It ...
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### Why not n=2 in Arrow's theorem

Why in the statement of Arrow's impossibility theorem we omit the case n=2? I will appreciate it if you can explain it in easy words. I'm by no means an expert in the area (I think it's very much ...
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### Decide the most favorable candidate

Consider an election voting process where people need to elect a representative among n number of candidates. Is there an approach to determine the most favorable option? Voting just a single person ...
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### Stability under supremum of sets of social choice function with single peaked preferences

Here is a question emerging from reading Moulin, H. (1980). On strategy-proofness and single peakedness. Public Choice, 35(4), 437–455. The setting is as follows: A non-empty finite set of ...
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### Does Arrow's Theorem apply when choosing a single best candidate?

According to Wiki, Arrow's Impossibility Theorem proves that we cannot create a social welfare function that obeys unanimity, non-dictatorship, and IIA. However, in real elections, we want to choose ...
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### What is the general formula for electoral districts tying.

I apologize if this question is a bit of a read. (You might want to get a frosty beverage.) Professor Alan Natapoff of MIT demonstrated, if 9 Voters are districted into 3 electoral districts of 3 ...
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### Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem versus Arrow Theorem

Arrow Theorem is a very classical result in social choice theory, stating very roughly that any reasonable voting procedure is either dictatorial or subject to tactical voting. More precisely, there ...