1
vote
1answer
31 views

Are the following two definitions of Borda winner equivalent?

The Borda count is a method used to determine the winner object where people rank objects. For instance, imagine each person ranking 3 objects. The highest ranked object gets 2 points, the second gets ...
2
votes
1answer
72 views

Counting in Arrow's theorem

I seem to be really confused with the counting system in Arrow's theorem. Can I have a simple explanation how they determine the outcome? I can't determine the outcome using rules from my notes. It ...
2
votes
2answers
99 views

Why not n=2 in Arrow's theorem

Why in the statement of Arrow's impossibility theorem we omit the case n=2? I will appreciate it if you can explain it in easy words. I'm by no means an expert in the area (I think it's very much ...
0
votes
2answers
76 views

Decide the most favorable candidate

Consider an election voting process where people need to elect a representative among n number of candidates. Is there an approach to determine the most favorable option? Voting just a single person ...
3
votes
1answer
73 views

Stability under supremum of sets of social choice function with single peaked preferences

Here is a question emerging from reading Moulin, H. (1980). On strategy-proofness and single peakedness. Public Choice, 35(4), 437–455. The setting is as follows: A non-empty finite set of ...
4
votes
2answers
104 views

Does Arrow's Theorem apply when choosing a single best candidate?

According to Wiki, Arrow's Impossibility Theorem proves that we cannot create a social welfare function that obeys unanimity, non-dictatorship, and IIA. However, in real elections, we want to choose ...
2
votes
1answer
117 views

What is the general formula for electoral districts tying.

I apologize if this question is a bit of a read. (You might want to get a frosty beverage.) Professor Alan Natapoff of MIT demonstrated, if 9 Voters are districted into 3 electoral districts of 3 ...
4
votes
1answer
466 views

Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem versus Arrow Theorem

Arrow Theorem is a very classical result in social choice theory, stating very roughly that any reasonable voting procedure is either dictatorial or subject to tactical voting. More precisely, there ...
8
votes
2answers
166 views

Is there a voting method with a sane strategy?

Is there a voting method where the best strategy for strategic voters can be explained in a sane way? According to Gibbard–Satterthwaite, there is no "strategy-free" (and reasonable) voting ...
7
votes
1answer
104 views

Does it make sense to run Meek STV with more choices than seats?

During the current batch of moderator elections at Gaming, it has been argued that since only 2 seats are up for grabs in this round of elections, it only makes sense to cast ballots by only ranking ...