Here is a question emerging from reading Moulin, H. (1980). On strategy-proofness and single peakedness. Public Choice, 35(4), 437–455. The setting is as follows: A non-empty finite set of ...
According to Wiki, Arrow's Impossibility Theorem proves that we cannot create a social welfare function that obeys unanimity, non-dictatorship, and IIA. However, in real elections, we want to choose ...
I apologize if this question is a bit of a read. (You might want to get a frosty beverage.) Professor Alan Natapoff of MIT demonstrated, if 9 Voters are districted into 3 electoral districts of 3 ...
Arrow Theorem is a very classical result in social choice theory, stating very roughly that any reasonable voting procedure is either dictatorial or subject to tactical voting. More precisely, there ...
Is there a voting method where the best strategy for strategic voters can be explained in a sane way? According to Gibbard–Satterthwaite, there is no "strategy-free" (and reasonable) voting ...
During the current batch of moderator elections at Gaming, it has been argued that since only 2 seats are up for grabs in this round of elections, it only makes sense to cast ballots by only ranking ...