# Tagged Questions

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### Gödel's way of teaching non-standard models to Takeuti.

In Memoirs of a Proof Theorist, Gaisi Takeuti relates how Gödel taught him about nonstandard models in an "interesting" way: It went as follows. Let T be a theory with a nonstandard model. By ...
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### ZFC Axioms to be extended?

Sorry if this is going to be a really loaded question. I was told several times that for virtually all theorems/corollaries/propositions of mathematics (except those cases not compatible with ZFC ...
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### Model-theory and Proof-theory in Propositional Logic

I'm trying to link results of model theory and proof-theory in propositional language. Here i will use $\models$ to denote logical consequence, in the model-theory sense. Being $x,y$ two formulas of ...
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### Can all theorems of $\sf ZFC$ about the natural numbers be proven in $\sf ZF$?

I know a proof of Hindman's theorem that uses ultrafilters on the natural numbers, and ultimately, the axiom of choice. But the theorem itself is essentially a combinatorial property of the natural ...
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### On Pudlak's “Life in an Inconsistent World”

In his Logical Foundation of Mathematics and Computational Complexity (2013), Pavel Pudlak invites the readers to ponder about fictitious people whose natural numbers are nonstandard. His exposition ...
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### True and provably true sentences in a model. Are they the same thing?

In logic, it is said that each sentence in a (consistent) theory is either true or false in a given model. Checking the truth of a sentence in a finite model amounts essentially to finite enumeration ...
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### Show $s(s(a))=s(b)$ implies $s(a)=b$

Let us have a first order language $L=\{0,s\}$, where $0$ is a constant, $s$ is a function symbol of arity $1$. The first-order theory $T$ is axiomatized as follows: $\forall x \neg( s(x) = 0)$ ...
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### How is the standard model of number theory specified, and why can't we use that specification to prove any number theoretical sentence of interest?

According to Gödel's incompleteness theorem, there exists a sentence $G$ in the vocabulary of number theory ($N$) which is not provable from any (recursively enumerable) consistent set of axioms $T$, ...
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### Different kinds of systems

I got interested in learning more about Logic, recently.The first thing i noticed is that this topic is a lot bigger than i expected. As i'm trying to make a sense of it all ( seeing the big picture ) ...
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### Does “=” have to be interpreted as equality?

To put it briefly: In model theory, we are allowed to interpret any relation symbol in any way we like. So why do people seem to require that "$=$" is interpreted as the actual equality? Let me ...
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### Axiom Systems and Formal Systems

I'm a really beginner in Mathematical Logic.I'm currently reading Shoenfield Mathematical's Logic and i'm having a hard time trying to relate the concept of Formal Systems with the concept of Axiom ...
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### Is there a useful Galois connection between Languages and Grammars?

I've just beginning to learn logic and proof theory - and the following rather vague and perhaps ill-formed question occurred to me. Given an alphabet it's straightforward to construct the Language, ...
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### What are the formal properties of Godel numbering that are required to make it 'work'?

Godel numbering assigns a number to every formula. It appears to me that any encoding will do. However its also apparent, though I'm not sure how, that certain properties of the encoding used in Godel ...
This is a very basic question, but for some reason I couldn't find an answer elsewhere on the Internet. Suppose we have an axiom system $A$ written in the language of second-order logic. In order to ...