Following Halmos's Naive Set Theory, Russell's Paradox emerges from using the axiom of specification (that for every set $A$ and property $\phi$ there exists a set $Y$ whose elements are those ...
Many of you know such paradox... " $\exists y \forall x (x \in y \Longleftrightarrow \Phi(x)$" for any function $\Phi(x)$ substitute $x \notin x$ for $\Phi(x)$ Then by existential instantiation ...
I notice that Russell's paradox, Burali-Forti's paradox, and even Cantor's paradox, all depend on our tolerance of sets that contain themselves (at one level of depth or another). Thus, I was thinking ...
The Russell paradox arise in the Cantor set theory, but it can be avoided in the $ZF$ and in $NGB$ axiomatic set theory. Are there other axiomatic set theories in which this paradox can be avoided? ...
In ZF classes are used informally to resolve Russells Paradox, that is the collection of all sets that do not contain themselves does not form a set but a proper class. But doesn't the same paradox ...
Skolem's paradox has been explained by the proposition that the notion of countability is not absolute in first-order logic. Intuitively, that makes sense to me, as a smaller model of ZFC might not be ...
I've heard of some other paradoxes involving sets (ie, "the set of all sets that do not contain themselves") and I understand how paradoxes arise from them. But this one I do not understand. Why is ...