Tagged Questions
3
votes
1answer
36 views
Stability under supremum of sets of social choice function with single peaked preferences
Here is a question emerging from reading Moulin, H. (1980). On strategy-proofness and single peakedness. Public Choice, 35(4), 437–455.
The setting is as follows:
A non-empty finite set of ...
0
votes
1answer
31 views
Using limit argument with non-continuous social-choice functions
This question is related to another question of mine Invariance of strategy-proof social choice function when peaks are made close from solution, and it revolves around the use of limit arguments with ...
6
votes
1answer
58 views
Invariance of strategy-proof social choice function when peaks are made close from solution
A question emerging from reading Schummer, J., & Vohra, R. V. (2002). Strategy-proof Location on a Network. Journal of Economic Theory, 104(2), 405–428.
The setting is as follows:
A finite set ...
4
votes
2answers
68 views
Does Arrow's Theorem apply when choosing a single best candidate?
According to Wiki, Arrow's Impossibility Theorem proves that we cannot create a social welfare function that obeys unanimity, non-dictatorship, and IIA.
However, in real elections, we want to choose ...
2
votes
0answers
58 views
What is the general formula for electoral districts tying.
I apologize if this question is a bit of a read. (You might want to get a frosty beverage.) Professor Alan Natapoff of MIT demonstrated, if 9 Voters are districted into 3 electoral districts of 3 ...
4
votes
1answer
81 views
Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem versus Arrow Theorem
Arrow Theorem is a very classical result in social choice theory, stating very roughly that any reasonable voting procedure is either dictatorial or subject to tactical voting. More precisely, there ...
0
votes
0answers
46 views
Can the Nash bargaining solution be applied in repeated game?
I am trying to develop a model involving two agents who interact strategically to set an optimal time for a joint work. These agents will have to meet repeatedly. I want to derive the optimal time for ...
1
vote
1answer
76 views
$N\setminus S$ is not $\beta$-effective for $A\setminus B$, and $S$ is not $\beta$-effective for $B$
Given a social choice function $F$, a subset $B\subset A$ of the candidates and a coalition $S\subset N$ of the voters, $\beta$-effectiveness of $S$ for $B$ is equivalent to $N\setminus S$ not being ...
1
vote
0answers
104 views
Question on social choice functions
We showed in class that every strongly, exactly consistent s.c.f is strongly firm (I don't know if this is the right translation - we defined strong firmness as the equivalence of $*,\alpha,\beta$ ...
