0
votes
1answer
65 views

Game Theory in relation to economics and sociology [closed]

I know some algebra and calculus, and have been reading about Linear Programming/Game Theory. How are the models in this field, even the infinite calculus models, usable in macro economics. Even ...
1
vote
0answers
40 views

Game Theory - Voting

In this setup there are 4 candidates running. For a candidate to be eliminated, the candidate needs to receive less than 1/3 of the votes when paired up with another candidate. This process ...
2
votes
1answer
73 views

the proof of Arrow's Theorem

I read Philip J. Reny's paper (Arrow’s Theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem: A Unified Approach) What I cannot understand is step 5 of the proof of arrow's theorem. I think figure 4 is a ...
0
votes
2answers
76 views

Decide the most favorable candidate

Consider an election voting process where people need to elect a representative among n number of candidates. Is there an approach to determine the most favorable option? Voting just a single person ...
3
votes
1answer
74 views

Stability under supremum of sets of social choice function with single peaked preferences

Here is a question emerging from reading Moulin, H. (1980). On strategy-proofness and single peakedness. Public Choice, 35(4), 437–455. The setting is as follows: A non-empty finite set of ...
0
votes
1answer
94 views

Using limit argument with non-continuous social-choice functions

This question is related to another question of mine Invariance of strategy-proof social choice function when peaks are made close from solution, and it revolves around the use of limit arguments with ...
6
votes
1answer
119 views

Invariance of strategy-proof social choice function when peaks are made close from solution

A question emerging from reading Schummer, J., & Vohra, R. V. (2002). Strategy-proof Location on a Network. Journal of Economic Theory, 104(2), 405–428. The setting is as follows: A finite set ...
4
votes
2answers
105 views

Does Arrow's Theorem apply when choosing a single best candidate?

According to Wiki, Arrow's Impossibility Theorem proves that we cannot create a social welfare function that obeys unanimity, non-dictatorship, and IIA. However, in real elections, we want to choose ...
2
votes
1answer
119 views

What is the general formula for electoral districts tying.

I apologize if this question is a bit of a read. (You might want to get a frosty beverage.) Professor Alan Natapoff of MIT demonstrated, if 9 Voters are districted into 3 electoral districts of 3 ...
4
votes
1answer
481 views

Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem versus Arrow Theorem

Arrow Theorem is a very classical result in social choice theory, stating very roughly that any reasonable voting procedure is either dictatorial or subject to tactical voting. More precisely, there ...
0
votes
0answers
87 views

Can the Nash bargaining solution be applied in repeated game?

I am trying to develop a model involving two agents who interact strategically to set an optimal time for a joint work. These agents will have to meet repeatedly. I want to derive the optimal time for ...
1
vote
1answer
80 views

$N\setminus S$ is not $\beta$-effective for $A\setminus B$, and $S$ is not $\beta$-effective for $B$

Given a social choice function $F$, a subset $B\subset A$ of the candidates and a coalition $S\subset N$ of the voters, $\beta$-effectiveness of $S$ for $B$ is equivalent to $N\setminus S$ not being ...
1
vote
0answers
114 views

Question on social choice functions

We showed in class that every strongly, exactly consistent s.c.f is strongly firm (I don't know if this is the right translation - we defined strong firmness as the equivalence of $*,\alpha,\beta$ ...