# Tagged Questions

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### Game Theory in relation to economics and sociology [closed]

I know some algebra and calculus, and have been reading about Linear Programming/Game Theory. How are the models in this field, even the infinite calculus models, usable in macro economics. Even ...
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### Game Theory - Voting

In this setup there are 4 candidates running. For a candidate to be eliminated, the candidate needs to receive less than 1/3 of the votes when paired up with another candidate. This process ...
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### the proof of Arrow's Theorem

I read Philip J. Reny's paper (Arrow’s Theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem: A Unified Approach) What I cannot understand is step 5 of the proof of arrow's theorem. I think figure 4 is a ...
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### Decide the most favorable candidate

Consider an election voting process where people need to elect a representative among n number of candidates. Is there an approach to determine the most favorable option? Voting just a single person ...
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### Stability under supremum of sets of social choice function with single peaked preferences

Here is a question emerging from reading Moulin, H. (1980). On strategy-proofness and single peakedness. Public Choice, 35(4), 437–455. The setting is as follows: A non-empty finite set of ...
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### Using limit argument with non-continuous social-choice functions

This question is related to another question of mine Invariance of strategy-proof social choice function when peaks are made close from solution, and it revolves around the use of limit arguments with ...
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### Invariance of strategy-proof social choice function when peaks are made close from solution

A question emerging from reading Schummer, J., & Vohra, R. V. (2002). Strategy-proof Location on a Network. Journal of Economic Theory, 104(2), 405–428. The setting is as follows: A finite set ...
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### Does Arrow's Theorem apply when choosing a single best candidate?

According to Wiki, Arrow's Impossibility Theorem proves that we cannot create a social welfare function that obeys unanimity, non-dictatorship, and IIA. However, in real elections, we want to choose ...
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### What is the general formula for electoral districts tying.

I apologize if this question is a bit of a read. (You might want to get a frosty beverage.) Professor Alan Natapoff of MIT demonstrated, if 9 Voters are districted into 3 electoral districts of 3 ...
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### Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem versus Arrow Theorem

Arrow Theorem is a very classical result in social choice theory, stating very roughly that any reasonable voting procedure is either dictatorial or subject to tactical voting. More precisely, there ...
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### Can the Nash bargaining solution be applied in repeated game?

I am trying to develop a model involving two agents who interact strategically to set an optimal time for a joint work. These agents will have to meet repeatedly. I want to derive the optimal time for ...
### $N\setminus S$ is not $\beta$-effective for $A\setminus B$, and $S$ is not $\beta$-effective for $B$
Given a social choice function $F$, a subset $B\subset A$ of the candidates and a coalition $S\subset N$ of the voters, $\beta$-effectiveness of $S$ for $B$ is equivalent to $N\setminus S$ not being ...
We showed in class that every strongly, exactly consistent s.c.f is strongly firm (I don't know if this is the right translation - we defined strong firmness as the equivalence of $*,\alpha,\beta$ ...