I am trying to understand what's wrong with the following logic related to "multiple conditioning." Why is the probability of [(A given B) given C] not the same as the probability of [A given (B and C)] ? I know it's not true, but only because numbers disagree. I am having a hard time parsing what's wrong with the logic.
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Peter Milne's paper "Bruno de Finetti and the Logic of Conditional Events" is an account of attempts to base probability theory upon conditional events, with special regard to de Finetti's subjectivistic "coherent betting behavior" approach using a three-valued logic. The latter approach results in a conditional event algebra with the property that both $$(A|B)|C \ \equiv \ A|(B \And C)$$ and $$A|(B|C) \equiv A|(B \And C)$$ where $A, B, C$ are ordinary propositions, implying that the respective probabilities must be equal. (This is contrary to your expectation that they should differ. See p. 218 of the cited paper, where what you've called "multiple conditioning" is called "iterated conditioning".) NB: In de Finetti's approach ...
This, of course, differs from standard presentations of probability theory, in which there are no such objects as "conditional events". |
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There's no such thing as [A given B]. It is NOT "the probabilty of {A given B}". Rather, it is "{the probability, given B} of A". |
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$\Pr(X | Y) = \dfrac{\Pr(X \cap Y)}{\Pr(Y)}$ so $\Pr((A|B)|C) = \dfrac{\Pr(A \cap B|C)}{\Pr(B|C)} =\dfrac{\frac{\Pr(A \cap B\cap C)}{\Pr(C)}}{\frac{\Pr(B\cap C)}{\Pr(C)}} = \dfrac{\Pr(A \cap B\cap C)}{\Pr(B\cap C)}=\Pr(A | B \cap C)$ so they are the same. Here is a way to check your numbers. If you have
where $s=d+e+f+g+h+i+j+k$, then $\Pr(B \cap C) = \dfrac{d+h}{s}$ and $\Pr(A | B \cap C) = \dfrac{d}{d+h}$. Given $C$, we just need to look at
where $t=d+f+h+j$ (and $\Pr(C)=t/s$), then $\Pr(B|C) = \dfrac{d+h}{t}$ and $\Pr((A|B)|C) = \dfrac{d}{d+h}$, the same as before. |
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