# Can the Nash bargaining solution be applied in repeated game?

I am trying to develop a model involving two agents who interact strategically to set an optimal time for a joint work. These agents will have to meet repeatedly. I want to derive the optimal time for joint work to characterize its properties. I suppose that they bargain to determine the optimal time, hence the optimal time of work is determined as Nash bargaining solution.

Will Nash bargaining solution apply in this context (repeated game)? Will there be a better way I can do this?

-
You have to be a bit more explicit about the kind of situation you want to model. –  Michael Greinecker Dec 17 '12 at 15:46
Suppose two individuals: A and B. Each is at home and would prefer to stay longer there. As each individual also desires to perform the joint work early, he or she would leave home early if the other proposes to start the joint work earlier. Each individual can propose a time to start the meeting. "Equilibrium" is reached when there is a start time for a joint activity $x$ which is optimal to each. My questions follows –  Daniel Lårs Dec 19 '12 at 9:12
Nashbargaining is an axiomatic theory of cooperative bargaining. What you propose is smething like Rubinstein's model of alternating offers bargaining. In that framework, bargaining itself takes time, and therefore lead to an automatic delay. –  Michael Greinecker Dec 19 '12 at 13:41
Judging from the bargaining procedure I stated, the problem seems to be in the realm of sequential bargaining (Rubin or breakdown). But, the procedure is my construct to justify Nash bargaining solution. The main idea is that, the players have to choose a convenient time to start the joint activity, based on self interest. –  Daniel Lårs Dec 19 '12 at 16:11