I am currently writing a paper on Tarski's Semantic Concept of Truth. His T-schema is as follows:
'X' is true if, and only if, 'p'
Where 'p' is a sentence such as "snow is white" and 'X' is the name of a sentence. If snow is white is used as an example (as Tarski did), the sentence reads:
"Snow is white" is true if, and only if snow is white.
Now, my question is to do with equivalence. Tarski calls all instances of this schema equivalences of the form 'T'. It is my opinion that Tarski's schema is not a true equivalence as it is not expressed as a relation between two things, but a sentence and it's name, and the relation is not clearly expressed. (Bela von Juhos made this objection to Tarski's theory - 1937 - and Adrian Heathcote has also made the same objection). The consequences of treating Tarski's theory as a true equivalence seem to be grave for Tarski's theory... I'm wondering what other people think of this, it also made me wonder whether a biconditional is the same as an equivalence? I'm a little confused... Let me know if more information or clarification is necessary. I found it an interesting topic for discussion :)